OT-Knight exec urges merging safety and cyber lifecycles for industrial systems

Rafael Barreto Jijón, managing director of OT-Knight, recently published a post on ISASecure arguing that industrial asset owners must integrate functional safety and operational technology cybersecurity into a single lifecycle. He contends that maintaining separate programs fails to address the interconnected risks present within industrial control systems, as both disciplines protect the same critical infrastructure.

According to Industrial Cyber, Jijón emphasizes that safety instrumented systems serve as a critical layer of protection against process hazards while simultaneously presenting targets for cyber-physical attacks. He argues that these systems require coordinated governance, engineering, and operational responses because a breach can constitute both a cybersecurity incident and a safety failure.

Standards and Historical Context

Jijón draws on the 2017 TRITON/TRISIS malware incident to illustrate the dangers of siloed approaches. That attack targeted safety systems, demonstrating that threats to industrial control systems can bypass traditional cybersecurity boundaries to impact physical safety. He asserts that existing standards already establish requirements for addressing these combined risks, including vulnerability assessments and security resilience measures.

The ISA/IEC 61511-1:2016 standard requires a security risk assessment to identify vulnerabilities in safety instrumented systems. It mandates that the system design provide necessary resilience against identified security risks. The standard also requires access security for bypasses, maintenance interfaces, and input/output forcing, along with documentation on securing communications where specified.

Operational Requirements and Governance

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1:2024 adds further requirements, stating that asset owners must have policies to protect safety systems from interference by non-safety networks and their devices. Jijón notes that the mandate runs both ways, meaning safety standards require cyber considerations and vice versa. He calls for reconciled requirements to ensure neither discipline is compromised during implementation.

He recommends aligning the functional safety lifecycle with the cybersecurity framework through joint risk assessments. This approach includes coordinated maintenance, change management, and integrated incident response procedures. Jijón also advocates for shared assessment schedules and continuous evidence collection to verify that both safety and cybersecurity requirements are met effectively.

What should you do?

Asset owners should review their current operational technology programs to identify gaps between safety and cybersecurity teams. They should verify that their risk assessments cover both functional safety and cyber threats to safety instrumented systems. Organizations should also ensure their maintenance and change management processes are coordinated across both disciplines.

What to do and how to stay safe: OT-Knight

• Conduct a joint risk assessment that evaluates both functional safety vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats to safety instrumented systems.
• Review existing policies to ensure safety systems are protected from interference by non-safety networks, as required by ISA/IEC 62443.
• Align maintenance and change management procedures so that safety and cybersecurity teams operate under a unified lifecycle.
• Verify that access controls for bypasses and engineering interfaces meet the security resilience requirements of ISA/IEC 61511.

Step-by-step guide: Mobile Device Security: How to Protect Data Beyond Passwords

General security guidance from the Threat Times newsroom. It is not confirmed advice from the organisations named in this story.

Frequently asked questions

Which standards require the integration of safety and cybersecurity?

ISA/IEC 61511-1:2016 and ISA/IEC 62443-2-1:2024 both establish requirements for addressing cybersecurity risks to safety systems and protecting them from network interference.

What real-world incident prompted this call for integration?

The 2017 TRITON/TRISIS malware incident, which targeted safety systems and demonstrated that cyber attacks can constitute both security and safety incidents.

What specific operational changes does Jijón recommend?

He recommends ending parallel programs in favor of a single lifecycle with joint risk assessments, coordinated maintenance, and integrated incident response procedures.